This paper will introduce the notion of a naming convention and use this paradigm to both develop a new version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem and to describe when an axiom system can partially evade the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
Introduction
The Second Incompleteness Theorem states that no consistent axiom system is able to verify its own consistency when it attains a sufficient level of strength. Our objective will be to explore the generality and boundary-case exceptions for this effect under a class of axiom systems that fail to recognize successor as a total function and instead treat addition and multiplication as 3-way relations. ( These formalisms cannot prove that ∀ x∃ y x + 1 = y.)
Instead, they will recognize the existence of an infinite collection of integers 0, 1, 2, ... by using an infinite number of constant symbols C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , ... . We will use the term "Naming Convention" to refer to a particular scheme for assigning integer values to named constant symbols. It will turn out that our ability to either generalize the Second Incompleteness Theorem or to find boundary-case exceptions to it will depend on the choice of naming method.
For simplicity, all our naming conventions will assign the values of 0, 1 and 2 to the first three constant symbols of C 0 , C 1 and C 2 , . For i ≥ 3 , our Incremental, Additive and Multiplicative Naming Conventions will use the three different identities, specified by Equations (1)- (3) , to define C i 's value recursively in terms of C i−1 's value. A more formal alternate definition of these naming conventions, that does not use the technically impermissible addition and multiplication function symbols, will appear in Section 3.
(1)
Integers having no formal names will be constructed from "named integers" via the operations of subtraction and division. (Thus since 5 = 8 − 2 − 1 , the term C 4 − C 2 − C 1 will define 5 under Equation (2)'s "additive" convention.)
One of our theorems will state that the additive naming convention does allow for some types of unusual boundary-type exceptions for the Hilbert-styled version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. (A similar result will also hold for the incremental naming convention by a degenerate and thus somewhat weaker form of Section 4's overall formalism.) On the other hand, Theorem 4 will state that every non-trivial, consistent axiom system α , using Equation (3)'s multiplicative naming convention, is unable to recognize its own Hilbert consistency. (The result of Theorem 4 differs from our prior papers [43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51] by examining a Hilbert mode of deduction, rather than the cut-free semantic tableaux deductive method.)
Some added notation is needed to describe our new results more formally. An axiom system α will be henceforth called Self-Justifying when: i) one of α's theorems will assert α 's consistency (using some reasonable definition of consistency), and ii) the axiom system α is in fact consistent.
It is well known [13, 15, 29 ] that Kleene's Fixed Point Theorem implies every r.e. axiom system α can be easily extended into a broader system α * which satisfies condition (i). Kleene's proposal [15] was essentially for α * to contain all α's axioms plus the following additional axiom sentence: # There is no proof of 0=1 from the union of α with "THIS SENTENCE".
Kleene noted that it was easy to apply the Fixed Point Theorem to formally encode a selfreferencing statement, similar to the sentence # . The catch is that α * can be inconsistent even while its added axiom # formally asserts α * 's consistency. For this reason, Kleene, Rogers and Jeroslow [13, 15, 29] each emphatically warned their readers that most axiom systems similar to α * were useless on account of their inconsistency, although they were technically welldefined. This problem arises in both Gödel's paradigm (where α extends Peano Arithmetic), as well as in more general settings [1, 3, 5, 11, 23, 28, 25, 32, 42, 47] .
Our prior research [43, 46, 51] has developed several examples of self-justifying axiom systems using analogs of the axiom-sentence # , despite these limitations, mostly for the case where an axiom system recognized addition as a total function and treated multiplication as a 3-way relation that was not provably total. (Thus if M (x, y, z) is a 3-way relation indicating that x * y = z then our axiom systems α were unable to prove ∀x ∀y ∃z M (x, y, z) ). In this context, we illustrated in [43, 46, 51] how several forms of the Kleene-like self-reflecting axiom # could construct self-justifying axiom systems under various definitions of semantic tableaux consistency.
The challenge in these articles was to assure the resulting axiom system α * did not violate
Part-ii of the definition of self-justification (by being inconsistent -due to a Gödel-like diagonalization argument -thereby making α * useless albeit well-defined -and thus irrelevant). Our articles [43, 46, 51] showed this difficulty did not plague systems recognizing solely addition as a total function for some natural definitions of semantic tableaux consistency.
On the other hand, [47] demonstrated the unavailability of this paradigm for circumventing the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness when an axiom system recognized multiplication as a total function.
Our goal in the present paper is to explore to what extent the preceding results about semantic tableaux definitions of consistency will generalize for definitions of consistency under
Hilbert-style proof systems. Our research was stimulated in part by some theorems of Nelson, Pudlák, Solovay and Wilkie-Paris [21, 25, 32, 42] . In particular, a formula ϕ(x) is called a Definable Cut for α iff α can prove the theorem:
ϕ(0) AND ∀ x ϕ(x) ⇒ ϕ(x + 1) AND ∀ x ∀ y < x ϕ(x) ⇒ ϕ(y)
Also, let Q denote the well-known axiom system of Tarski-Mostowski-Robinson [36] that recognizes addition and multiplication as total functions, but contains little information about addition and multiplication beyond that. Tarski-Mostowski-Robinson [36] , showed a general-ization of the Gödel [9] and Rosser [28] versions of the First Incompleteness Theorem, which they called "Essential Undecidability", was valid for Q , all its extensions, but none of its subsets. There have been several examples of generalizations of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem for Q beginning with Bezboruah-Shepherdson's initial observations [5] on this subject (demonstrating that there were at least some particularized encodings of the provability predicate under which Q was unable to prove its own Hilbert Consistency). Wilkie-Paris announced several extensions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem in [42] -demonstrating for instance that axiom systems as powerful as IΣ 0 + Exp are unable to prove the Hilbertconsistency of formalisms as weak as Q. Pudlák [25] proved the following new form of the Second Incompleteness result:
Theorem 1 (Pudlák 1985) . Suppose the consistent axiom system α satisfies α ⊃ Q , ϕ(x) denotes any of Equation (4) Paris [21, 42] , to obtain the following result about canonical formalizations of arithmetic: A) β is able to prove Eq. (5)'s statement that successor is a total function.
B) β is able to prove a Π 1 type formatted theorem indicating the A(x, y, z) and M (x, y, z) predicates satisfy the associative, commutative, distributive and identity-element axioms for addition and multiplication.
Then β must be unable to prove the non-existence of a Hilbert-style proof of 0=1 from β 's set of axioms.
The following two observations will help explain the relationship between the preceding two theorems of Pudlák and Solovay:
1. Let us say that an axiom system β recognizes addition and multiplication as total functions iff it can prove:
The Theorem 2 by Solovay is an immediate consequence of the 1985 Theorem 1 by
Pudlák when Equation (6) is made to replace Equation (5)'s formalism in Theorem 2's hypothesis.
2. The reason that Solovay had communicated in April of 1994 to us the content of Theorem 2 is that we published in 1993 a paper [43] which showed that boundary-case exceptions to the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem do exist among axiom systems that recognize addition but not multiplication as a total function. Our paper [43] thus raised the question whether such boundary-case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem can be extended to Hilbert styled proofs under axiom systems that recognize solely addition as total? The Theorem 2 by Solovay is significant because it shows that no such extension is feasible for the Hilbert-style method of deduction.
A more detailed description of the formalisms that were employed by Theorems 1 and 2 and the related literature will appear during Section 2's literature survey. At a first glance, it would certainly appear that Theorem 2 implies no meaningful axiom system can recognize its own Hilbert consistency -simply because Equation (5)'s axiom, recognizing successor as total, is the main threshold for activating Theorem 2 's formalism.
However, it turns out that Theorems 1 and 2 do allow for a subtle form of exception to exist for the Hilbert-styled version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. This is because
Equations (2) Theorem is available when a system employs Equation (3)'s multiplicative naming convention.
(The point is that neither of these results are predicted by the earlier literature because the prior Theorems 1 and 2 presumed their axiom systems would recognize at least successor as a total function.)
Some added notation will help formalize our new results. Say a function F satisfies a Non-
Seven examples of non-growth functions are Integer Subtraction (where x − y is defined to equal 0 when x < y ), Division-with-rounding (where x ÷ y is defined to equal x when y = 0, and it equals
and Count(x, j) designating the number of "1" bits among x's rightmost j bits. These functions are called the Grounding
Functions.
We will use the term Π 
where t is a term built out of the grounding function primitives. Let us call a formula ∆ − 0 when all its quantifiers are bounded, its two relation symbols are " = " and " ≤ " and it uses the grounding function symbols. Then Υ will be called Π − 1 when it is written in the form ∀v 1 ∀v 2 ... ∀v n Φ , where Φ is ∆ − 0 . Using this terminology, our two main theorems are listed below: Theorem 3 . Let A denote an arbitrary, consistent axiom system (using the grounding function language) all of whose Π − 1 theorems are logically valid under the standard model of the natural numbers. Suppose there also exists a ∆ − 0 encoding for the predicate HilbPrf A (t, p) -which formally indicates that p is a Hilbert-style proof of the theorem t from axiom system A . Then there exists a consistent axiom system, called ISCE(A) (which is formally defined in Section 4), whose constant symbols are defined via the additive naming convention's methodology and which has an ability to i. recognize the validity of all A's Π − 1 theorems, ii. recognize the assured non-existence of a Hilbert-style proof of 0=1 from its own set of proper axioms.
Theorem 4 . No consistent axiom system α is capable of proving a theorem affirming its own Hilbert-Consistency when it 1) contains all the multiplicative naming convention's axioms, 2) retains an ability to prove all Peano Arithmetic's Π A second interesting aspect requires some added notation to explain. Let us say a sequence of axioms S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , ... defining the constant symbols C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , ... is Continuously Expanding iff there exists a sequence of constants K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , ... with K i < K i+1 such that the set of axioms with Gödel numbers less than K i is sufficient to generate a proof of the existence of an integer larger than K i+1 . For example, the additive and multiplicative conventions, defined by Equations (2) and (3), satisfy the continuous expansion property -under the normalized assumption that the axiom defining C i has a O(Log (i + 2)) bit-length. On the other hand, Equation (1)'s incremental naming convention is not continuously expanding because it grows too slowly.
Ideally, an axiom system α should satisfy the continuous expansion property -even if it fails to recognize successor as a total function -because the latter feature formalizes at least some type of weak notion of an infinite growth among integers. This explains the second reason for our interest in Theorems 3 and 4. A degenerate version of Theorem 3 -with the incremental naming convention replacing the additive method -was established by the Theorem 3.4 of [46] . However Theorem 3.4's axiom systems failed to satisfy the continuous expansion property because they relied upon the slow growing incremental naming convention.
The additive convention will thus represent a useful compromise between the faster-growing multiplicative convention and the slower incremental convention -whose growth rate is simultaneously sufficiently slow to satisfy Theorem 3's self-justification property while also sufficiently fast to satisfy the continuous expansion property. This distinction is significant because the terms K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , ... in the additive convention's continuous expansion sequence will grow at a fast super-exponential rate.
One further definition is needed to describe a third theme in this article. Let P red N (x) denote a compound operation that consists of N iterations of the predecessor function (thereby causing P red N (x) = x − N ). Say an axiom system α is Infinitely Far-
Reaching iff there exists a finite subset of axioms S ⊂ α such that for an arbitrary integer N, the finite set S is sufficient to prove ∃x P red N (x) = 1 . Section 6 will outline how it is theoretically possible to construct an axiom system, which is simultaneously 1) Infintely Far Reaching, 2) able to verify its own Hilbert consistency, and 3) able to to prove all Peano Arithmetic's Π − 1 theorems. Section 6's axiom system will be highly awkward in its internal structure. However, it is noteworthy because one's first intuition would be that the combination of the incompleteness effects described by Theorems 1, 2 and 4 would preclude a formalism from satisfying conditions 1-3 simultaneously.
Over-all Perspectives and Objectives of this Article: Any axiom system which fails to recognize successor as a total function is certainly a mixed blessing, whose weaknesses certainly cannot be overlooked or ignored. However, Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem beckons one to wonder whether there are any boundary-case circumstances where the force of the Second Incompleteness Theorem can at least be partially evaded. Theorem 3 and Section 6's ISINF(A) formalism will illustrate two types of partially curious forms of self-justifying systems that can be formally constructed. On the other hand, the prior literature's Theorems 1 and 2 and our new Theorems 4 and 7 will indicate that there is a firm limit as to how far one can strengthen these boundary-case exceptions for the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
This topic has a different slant than the study of semantic tableaux in [43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51] because the Theorem 2 (by Solovay) shows Hilbert-style exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem cannot recognize even successor as a total function. It thus has a different flavor than the semantic tableaux formalisms of [43, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51] , which recognized addition as a total function.
Background Literature
Let S(x) denote the "successor" operation that maps the integer x onto x + 1. A formula ϕ(x) is called [11] a Definable Cut for an axiom system α iff α can prove:
The articles [1, 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 33, 38, 39, 41, 42] have studied Definable cuts. This concept is unrelated to a Gentzen-like "deductive cut rule".
In a context where Υ(x) and ϕ(x) denote two definable cuts, the formula ϕ(x) has been called a Thinning of Υ(x) (relative to α ) iff α can prove:
The symbol Ψ will henceforth denote Ψ 's Gödel number, and Prf α , D (t, p) will denote that p is a proof of the theorem t from the axiom system α using the deduction method D . The system α will be said to recognize its Cut-Localized D-consistency under ϕ(x) iff α can prove:
The recent literature has sought to identify exactly what triples ( ϕ , D , α ) have the property that α can prove (9) 4. Pudlák proved two results about Equation (9) in [25] . The first was a substantial generalization of Items 2 and 3 (above), which showed that every "sequential" [11] axiom system of finite cardinality can be associated with a definable cut ϕ such that α can prove Equation (9) is valid for ϕ when D denotes any cut-free method of deduction. The Theorem 1 , mentioned earlier in Section 1, also appeared in Pudlák's article [25] . It indicated that no consistent α ⊃ Q can prove any form of Equation (9 where most (even weak) arithmetic axiom systems α can prove: -so it will apply to axiom systems recognizing merely successor as a total function.
To help publicize this never-published result, we published a proof of a weak version of Theorem 2 -with attribution to our communications with Solovay -in Appendix A of our year-2001 article [46] . This appendix's result is not quite as strong as the broader version of Solovay's Theorem 2 , but it has the virtue of having a pleasantly short 4-page proof.
8. Paris-Dimitracopoulos [23] (and Pudlák [25] using a different method) both observed that for an arbitrary initial definable cut Υ , it is not always automatically feasible to construct a thinner cut ϕ that is closed under the operation of Exponentiation.
9. Characterizations of relative interpretability for finitely axiomatized sequential theories were independently developed by Friedman and Pudlák in [8, 25] . See some papers by
Smoryński and Visser [31, 37, 40] for some very detailed descriptions of these contributions by Friedman and Pudlák.
10. Let Con ϕ (IΣ 0 ) denote the variant of Equation (9) where 1) α =IΣ 0 , 2) D designates the Hilbert deduction method and 3) ϕ represents Equation (9)'s employed definable cut. Krajícek [16] proved that for any IΣ 0 cut Υ there exists a thinner IΣ 0 cut ϕ such that the theorem IΣ 0 + Con
is consistent, and that an analog of this construct holds for any finitely generated sequential theory under the Wilkie-Paris notion of a restricted proof [42] . Visser [39] generalized this construct to show that many consistent axiom systems, such as Q , ACA 0 and GB-Set Theory, have the property that no finite consistent extension of themselves implies there exists Hilbert-style proofs of 0=1 from themselves simultaneously positioned in each of their definable cuts.
11. Buss, Ignjatovic, Krajícek, Pudlák and Takeuti [6, 7, 18, 26, 35] have explored the problem of separating Buss's axiom system S 2 into its sub-systems called S [7] showed that P V is unable to confirm the consistency of its induction-free fragment, called P V − .
A small amount of additional notation is needed to describe one further development in [24] about whether any extension of IΣ 0 can prove its own cut-free consistency. In this context, Adamowicz-Zbierski [1, 3] used Generalized Gödel sentences to show that a cutfree version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem was valid at the level of IΣ 0 + Ω 1 , Willard's two papers [45, 47] strengthened this result to show that such a cut-free second incompleteness effect applied to all extensions of IΣ 0 and most extensions of Q , and Salehi [30] has recently explored some other types of interesting proofs of this incompleteness effect.
One type of formalism that combines the theories of definable cuts and of Generalized Gödel Sentences into a hybridized framework can be found in [49] . It examines a hierarchy of several increasingly elaborate definitions of semantic tableaux consistency, where one wishes to determine at what level in this hierarchy does the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem become operative for axiom systems that recognize addition (but not multiplication) as a total function. Via a hybridizing of the theory of definable cuts with the notion of a Generalized Gödel Sentence, [49] obtained an incompleteness result for this hierarchy.
Finally, let us return to the Theorems 1 and 2 of Pudlák and Solovay. Theorem 2 was described by Solovay as resulting from the combined research efforts of himself and of Nelson, Pudlák and Wilkie-Paris. It stated that no axiom system can prove its own Hilbert consistency and also recognize successor as a total function. An important fact is that Theorem 2 does not apply to semantic tableaux deduction, since our papers [43, 46, 48, 51] had established that semantic tableaux boundary-case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem can recognize addition as a total function. Hence, there naturally arises the question to consider whether some type of axiom system, dropping the assumption that successor is a total function, can recognize its own Hilbert consistency? Our Theorems 3, 4, 6 and 7 will partially answer this question by providing some closely matching positive and negative results.
Main Notation Conventions
This section will offer a brief summary of the formal notation used in this paper. An intuitive (but not formal) description of the three incremental, additive and multiplicative naming conventions was provided by Equations (1)- (3) in the Introduction Section. These equations should not be regarded as the formal definitions of these three naming conventions because the addition and multiplication function symbols were employed in their recursive definitions. To rectify this problem, we need to rewrite these equations in a language that has the grounding function symbols of predecessor, subtraction and division-with-rounding replace the roles of addition and multiplication.
Our first task is to define the constant symbols C 0 , C 1 and C 2 to represent the integers of 0, 1 and 2. Since Predecessor(0) = 0, this is done below:
These two ∆ − 0 predicates do not technically use the Multiplication and Addition function symbols, but a triple satisfies them only when respectively x + y = z and x * y = z are true.
Finally, let j 1 , j 2 , j 3 ... , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ... and b 1 , b 2 , b 3 ... denote the axiom-sequences, used by our incremental, additive and multiplicative naming conventions. The ADD(x, y, z) and MULT(x, y, z) predicates allow us to rewrite the description of these axioms (from Equations (1)- (3) ) in a revised language that replaces the Addition and Multiplication function symbols with the operations of Predecessor, Subtraction and Division-with-rounding. Thus, the first formal axiom of these three conventions (i.e. j 1 , a 1 and b 1 ) is defined by Equation (11).
For i ≥ 2 their additional axioms are:
Let Bit(x, i) denote the i−th rightmost bit associated with the binary encoding of the integer x . Equation (15) shows how one can encode the term Bit(x, i) in our grounding function language as a compound function built out of the grounding operations of count and subtraction:
Let us recall that P red N (x) denotes an operation that consists of N iterations of the predecessor function (thereby causing P red N (x) = x − N ). Section 1 had defined our grounding function Log(x) to formally represent the integer value of 1 + Log 2 x . Let L d
denote an integer constant that represents the bit-length of the integer d 's binary encoding, and let its binary representation be formally encoded by the bit-sequence
formula. It has the characteristic that the only integer x satisfying (16) is the integer d itself.
Since Φ denotes Φ's Gödel number, our notation convention will imply that the only integer x satisfying σ Φ (x) is Φ's Gödel number.
Our method for encoding Gödel numbers is defined in Appendix A. This convention is ideally compact insofar as its encoding of a particular sentence or proof will have a bit-length that is essentially proportional to the effort to write down such an object by hand. Other examples of ideally-compact Gödel encoding schemes have been described by for example
Hájek-Pudlák and Wilkie-Paris in [11, 42] . It is therefore probably unnecessary for a reader to examine Appendix A in much detail. Essentially, Appendix A can be omitted provided the reader keeps in mind that the bit-length needed for encoding the name of the symbol C i , as well as for encoding the accompanying axioms j i , a i or b i , will have an ideally compressed O( Log(i + 1 ) ) order of magnitude.
Our results also generalize in various forms for non-compressed encodings, where C i has an O(i) bit-length instead. We omit discussing these generalizations here because uncompressed encodings are inherently unnatural.
The ISCE Formalism and its Generalizations
This section will be devoted to proving Theorem 3 and defining its accompanying ISCE(A)
formalism. In our discussion, a Π − 1 sentence will be called 2-reduced iff it uses only the constant symbols for the three natural numbers 0,1 and 2. This restriction is not serious because every unreduced Π − 1 sentence has a 2-reduced counterpart that is equivalent to it under Equation (16) 
A similar transformation is obviously available to map every unreduced Π − 1 sentence onto its equivalent 2-reduced counterpart. Moreover in the context of axiom systems that recognize the existence of an unending sequence of natural numbers 0,1,2, .... by using for example the additive naming convention, the 2-reduced sentence (17) is provably equivalent to its unreduced counterpart " ∀x φ( x ,k ) ". Thus, there is no difficulty when we employ 2-reduced Π − 1 sentences in this section. Often we will omit the phrase "2-reduced" when it is evident that the Π − 1 sentence is 2-reduced.
The acronym "ISCE" will stand for Introspective Semantics with Continuous Expansion".
It will be defined similarly to [43, 46] 's IS(A) and ISREF(A) axiom systems except that ISCE(A) will hybridize Section 1's continuous expansion property with an ability of a selfreflecting formalism to recognize its own Hilbert consistency. Given an initial axiom system A , ISCE(A) will thus be defined to be a self-justifying axiom system, capable of proving all of A 's Π − 1 theorems, and consisting of the following four axiom groups:
GROUP-ZERO: This axiom group will consist of the axiom sentences a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ... used by Equations (11) and (13) of Section 3's additive naming method. It differs from the Group-Zero axioms in our earlier papers by using an additive (rather than incremental) naming method. (Note that additive naming is continuously expanding, but incremental naming is not.)
GROUP-1:
This group will consist of a finite set of Π − 1 axioms defining ISCE's grounding functions. This means that for each grounding function G and set of numbers k, k 1 , k 2 , ...k m , the combination of the Group-Zero and Group-1 axioms will imply G(k 1 , k 2 , ...k m ) = k when this sentence is true. The Group-1 scheme will also assign the "=" and "<" predicates their usual logical properties. Any finite set of 2-reduced Π − 1 sentences that meet the preceding conditions is adequate. Table I of [46] provides one example of a suitable set of Group-1 axioms.
GROUP-2:
Let Φ denote Φ's Gödel number, and HilbPrf A (x, y) denote a ∆ − 0 formula indicating y is a proof from axiom system A of the theorem x. Suppose that A uses the same grounding function symbols as ISCE(A), and it therefore generates a set of Π − 1 theorems. For each Π − 1 sentence Φ, our prior papers had the Group-2 schema contain an axiom of the form:
The Group-2 axioms of ISCE(A) will have essentially the same format, except we cannot use exactly Equation (18) 
ISCE(A) will contain one such axiom for each 2-reduced Π − 1 sentence Φ.
GROUP-3: ISCE(A)'s Group-3 axiom will consist of a single Π − 1 sentence that essentially corresponds to the following statement:
♠ "There is no Hilbert-style proof of 0=1 from the union of the Group-0, 1 and 2 axioms with THIS SENTENCE (referring to itself)".
We have already illustrated in several papers [44, 46] Proof Sketch. Our justification of Lemma 1 will be somewhat abbreviated because analogous techniques were previously used in our paper [46] to define its Group-3 axiom. In particular, let us employ the following notation:
1. Subst ( g , h ) will denote Gödel's classic substitution formula, which yields TRUE when h is a formula identical to g -except that it replaces all g's free variables with an integer term equal to g's Gödel number.
2. UNION(A) will denote the union of ISCE(A)'s Groups 0, 1 and 2 axioms. UNION(A) (t, p) is a formula stating that p represents a Hilbert-style proof of the theorem t from the axiom system UNION(A). t, h, p) is a formula stating that p represents a Hilbert-style proof of the theorem t from the union of the axiom system UNION(A) with the additional axiom-sentence whose Gödel number is represented by the integer h . FixPointPrf(t, g, p) will be an abbreviation for the sentence:
HilbPrf

ExtraPrf UNION(A) (
5.
Appendixes B through D of our article [46] had explained in meticulous detail how one could use the theory of LinH functions [11, 17, 52 ] to provide ∆ − 0 encodings for each of the formulae of Subst(g, h), HilbPrf UNION(A) (t, p) and ExtraPrf UNION(A) (t, h, p). It therefore follows that Equation (21)'s compound formula of FixPointPrf(t, g, p) also has a ∆ − 0 encoding. This in turn implies that Equation (22) (below) has a Π − 1 encoding:
The only free variable in Equation (21) is g. Let Ψ(g) denote this formula, and θ denote Ψ(g)'s Gödel number. Also, let C * denote the particular constant employed by our additive naming convention that represents the least power of 2 greater than θ . Let θ denote a term whose value equals θ -where θ 's encoding has a binary-like format with its term beginning with the constant symbol C * and then subtracting the Log 2 θ or fewer needed powers of 2 smaller than C * , so that θ's exact value is produced. The Equation (23)'s sentence can then be viewed as being the formal semantic representation of either Equation (20)'s sentence or the equivalent Group-3 statement ♠ . 
The formal statement of Theorem 3 was given in Section 1. It was essentially that the axiom system ISCE(A) will be automatically consistent whenever:
1. All A's Π B) The interpretation M k j will assume no integer larger than j = 2 k exists. By this we mean that both the "named integers", associated with explicitly denoted constant symbols C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , ... , and also the "unnamed integers" (which are not assigned a designated constant symbol) are presumed under the interpretation M k j to assume values no larger than j = 2 k .
Since the additive naming convention's i−th axiom a i causes
is obviously consistent with all this convention's axioms a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ... except for the axiom a k+1 , which plainly violates Requirement-A.
Also because the grounding functions are non-growth functions, each 2-reduced Π − 1 sentence, which is valid under the standard model, must be automatically valid also in the finite model 
We will now use Equation (24) to prove q < p , a result that will finish our proof-bycontradiction (by contradicting the initial assumption that p was the minimal proof of 0=1 from ISCE(A) ). The preceding paragraph had demonstrated how p 's proof of 0=1 had employed Equation (20)'s Group-3 axiom as one of its essential steps. Let G again denote the Gödel number of this Group-3 axiom. Since Equation (23)'s Group-3 axiom is a necessary step in p's proof, it is obvious that p's bit-length is certainly more than three times the length of this Group-3 axiom (under all natural methods for the Gödel encoding of a proof, including the particular encoding methods we have sketched in Appendix A). Hence, Equation (25) formalizes this inequality:
Moreover, let L denote the number of Group-zero axioms appearing inside the proof p .
Then the quantity k (defined in the second paragraph of this proof) obviously satisfies the inequality:
Under all usual encoding conventions, including the particular convention sketched in Appendix A, the number of Group-zero axioms in p's proof will be less than 1 3 Log 2 (p). (This is because every Group-zero axiom uses more than 3 bits of storage.) Equation (27) formalizes this inequality:
In order to now finish our proof-by-contradiction, we must show that the combination of
Equations (24) - (27) imply that:
The justification of (28)'s inequality is quite trivial. It is because the presence of the factors "3" in Equation (25) and 1 3 in (27) assure (via Equations (24) and (26) ) that Log(q) is no more than essentially 2 3 of the size of Log(p) (whenever p has more than a tiny length of say roughly 100 bits).
Equation (28)'s inequality q < p clearly contradicts our initial assumption that p was the minimal proof of 0=1 from ISCE(A). Hence, our proof-by-contradiction has shown that Theorem 3 must be valid because otherwise the required minimal size of the proof p will be violated. 2
Significance of Theorem 3. Part of what makes Theorem 3 interesting is that there is a tight match between this theorem's boundary-case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness
Theorem and Theorem 4's generalization for it (because these two theorems differ only by replacing the former's additive naming convention with the latter's multiplicative convention).
A second interesting aspect of ISCE(A) is that it satisfies a "continuous expansion property" (where the concerned axiom system can be associated with a sequence of integers
.. , such that the union of all the axioms with Gödel number less than K i can be combined to prove the existence of an integer larger than K i+1 ) . What makes this expansion paradigm especially interesting is that the sequence
.. grows at a very fast rate as its index goes to infinity. In particular, let 2 
There is also a third interesting facet of the ISCE(A) axiom system. For a prenex normal sentence Ψ, let Ψ and TangDiv(x) denote the following two formulae:
In a notation where Tangible(x) denotes either TangPred(x) or TangDiv(x), an axiom system α's Tangibility Reflection Principle for the sentence Ψ is defined to be the assertion:
Our prior papers [44, 46] 
had illustrated two examples of self-justifying systems, called ISREF(A)
and ISTR(A), that could prove the correctness of their respective TangPred and TangDiv reflection principles for every prenex normal sentence Ψ . These papers also explained why a system α's ability to prove the validity of its tangibility reflection principle for each sentence Ψ is a much stronger form of self-justifying assertion than α's mere ability to prove the non-existence of a proof of " 0 = 1 " from itself (see footnote 1 ).
The term "incremental naming convention" had not appeared in our article [46] . However, In the interests of brevity, Theorem 3* 's proof shall not be presented here. This proof was omitted mostly because it is a natural hybrid of the Theorem 3's proof with the added formalism that [46] used to prove its Theorem 3.4. A second reason for focusing on the weaker but simpler version of Theorem 3 is that the contrast between the opposing positive and negative results of Theorems 3 and 4 is easier to visualize under Theorem 3's simpler version.
Incompleteness under the Multiplicative Naming Convention
This section will discuss the incompleteness properties of an axiom system that employs Equation (14)'s multiplicative naming convention.
Definition 1.
Let us recall Equation (16) defined σ n (x) to be a ∆ − 0 formula that was satisfied only when x corresponded to the natural number n. Define HilbPrf α (x, y) to have a Concise Gödel Encoding iff HilbPrf α (x, y)'s formula is ∆ − 0 and there exists a constant R > 0 and an accompanying finite subset F ⊂ α which satisfy the following two invariants: I) ∀ p ∀ t If p is the proof of the theorem t from the axiom system α then ∃ q < 2 p R where q is a proof from axiom system F of:
II) Peano Arithmetic can formally prove that the triple (α, F, R) satisfies Item I's require-
ments. (This added condition is typically trivial to satisfy).
It is easily verified that essentially all r.e. axiom systems have concise encodings. Indeed, Definition 1's constraint q < 2 p R is somewhat excessive because q will typically have a much smaller magnitude. Theorem 4's requirement that α has a concise encoding is thus a very minor constraint.
It should also be noted that Definition 1's formalism will be omitted when Appendix C sketehes a proof of a somewhat stronger version of Theorem 4.
Lemma 2 . Let α denote any axiom system that can prove all Peano Arithmetic's Π − 1 theorems and which also employs the multiplicative naming convention's axioms. Let σ n (x) again be defined by Equation (16) . Then there will exist a constant K α (whose value depends only on α ) such that there exists a proof from α of the sentence (32), whose length is bounded
Proof. For i ≥ 2 the multiplicative convention's axiom b i (defined in Equation (14) ) In a context where one employs the " ShortPrf λ α (x, y, z) " proof-notation, there exists no code (y, z) that "proves" this sentence (looking at itself).
It is easy to assign 0 λ (α) a formal Π − 1 encoding by following Gödel's classic example. Thus, let Subst*(g, h) denote the following ∆ − 0 formula: Subst*(g, h) = The integer g is an encoding of a formula, and h encodes a sentence identical to g, except that all free variables in g are now replaced with Definition 2's term g .
Then 0
λ (α) is defined as the Π 1 sentence Γ( n ) , where Γ(g) denotes the formula in (33) , n is its Gödel number, and n is a formal term representing n 's integer value.
In Lemma 4, the symbol ⊥ denotes the Gödel number of the sentence 0=1. 
Proof: Consider a sentence identical to (34) , except that its clauses z > L α and x < z are now removed. (Equation (35) illustrates this sentence.) We will first prove (35)'s validity in the standard model and then prove Lemma 4.
We will prove (35) by assuming (y, z) satisfies ShortPrf 2 α ( 0 2 (α) , y, z) . Our proof will construct four substrings, called x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , such that their bit-wise concatenation represents the proof x whose existence is claimed by (35) . The formal definition of these four stings x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 is as follows:
1. The substring x 1 will be simply the integer y . It will thus be a proof from α of 0 2 (α).
2. The substring x 2 will be a proof from α that y proves 0 2 (α). (Since Lemma 4's hypothesis contains a conciseness assumption, Definition 1 thereby implies x 2 < 2 y R , for a constant R whose value depends on α.)
3. The substring x 3 will be a proof from α that " ∃v LogLog(v) = y ". (Lemma 2 assures x 3 is sufficiently small for Log(
, where K α is a constant that depends only on α.)
4. The substring x 4 will combine the intermediate results from the preceding segments to derive the conclusion "0=1". It is easy for x 4 to do this because x 1 proved the diagonalizing theorem 0 2 (α), which states essentially that "There is no code (y,z) that is a proof of me", while x 2 and x 3 proved precisely such y and z do exist. (The length of x 4 is inconsequential because it is much smaller than the lengths of x 1 , x 2 and x 3 .)
This construction clearly shows that Equation (35) is valid under the standard model of the natural numbers because the integer x , that is the natural concatenation of the four substrings x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , obviously satisfies the claim of Equation (35) . Moreover, it is easy to extend our construction to also verify Equation (34)'s slightly stronger claim. This is because we can choose a constant L α such that if z > L α then each of the four preceding strings satisfy
Log(z) (see footnote 2 ). Thus the natural concatenation of these four strings will consist of an element x that meets Equation (34) 
2 Items 1-4 of the footnoted paragraph specified upper bounds on the lengths of the four strings x 1 , x 2 , x 3 and x 4 . It also may be presumed y =LogLog(z) because (y, z) satisfies the predicate ShortPrf 2 α ( 0 2 (α) , y, z). These observations trivially imply that we can choose a large enough value for L α such that each of the four x i automatically satisfy Log(x i ) < Proof. An intermediate step in our proof of Lemma 4 had shown Equation (35) was valid under the standard model. Since α is consistent, it immediately follows that (37) is also certainly valid under the standard model.
The validity of (37) is of course insufficient to assure that Peano Arithmetic can actually derive this sentence as a theorem. However, it is well-known that Peano Arithmetic can prove every ∆ − 0 sentence that is valid. In particular, Equation (38) (below) is a ∆ − 0 sentence that differs from (37) by having the range of its universally quantified variables bounded by Lemma 4's constant L α . Hence, the validity of (37) implies the validity of (38) , which in turn implies that Peano Arithmetic must be able to prove (38) as a theorem.
Since ShortPrf 2 α (x, y, z) forces y < z, Peano Arithmetic can use (38) to get:
The combination of Corollary 1 and the preceding paragraph demonstrate that Peano Arithmetic can prove the assertions of Equations (34) and (39) . This implies Peano Arithmetic can also formally verify Equation (36) (because it is an immediate consequence of (34) and (39) ). 2
Theorem 5 Assume ShortPrf λ α (x, y, z) and Definition 3's formula Subst*(g, h) have ∆ − 0 encodings. Suppose α is an axiom system that has a capacity for proving all the ∆ − 0 sentences that are valid in the standard model of the natural numbers. Also assume (for some fixed constant λ ) that α has a capacity to prove the three theorems listed below. Then α is inconsistent.
We have put the proof of Theorem 5 into Appendix B because its justification is quite similar to the Theorem 2.3 that was proved in [47] .
Let us recall that Theorem 4's formal statement (from Section 1) stated that no consistent axiom system α can prove a theorem corroborating its own Hilbert-Consistency when it contains all the multiplicative naming convention's axioms, satisfies Definition 1's "concise encoding" property and also retains an ability to prove all Peano Arithmetic's Π − 1 theorems. The formal proof of this theorem is given below:
Proof: For the sake of constructing a proof-by-contradiction, let us temporarily assume Theorem 4 was false. Then there would exist a consistent axiom system α satisfying Theorem 4's hypothesis and the condition below:
Let λ = 2. It is then easy to establish (α, λ) satisfies the three requirements of Theorem 5's hypothesis. The justification of this claim is given below:
1. Equation (40) shows α can prove Theorem 5's needed sentence (A).
2. It is easy to apply Lemma 5 to establish α can also prove the sentence (B) from Theorem 5's hypothesis. This is because Lemma 5 shows that Equation (36) 
Infinite Far Reach
An axiom system α is called Infinitely Far-Reaching iff there exists a finite subset of axioms S ⊂ α such that for arbitrary N this fixed-and-finite set S is sufficient to prove ∃x P red N (x) = 1 . This section will demonstrate Infinitely Far-Reaching systems exist that are capable of recognizing their own Hilbert consistency. The ISINF(A) system, defined in this section, will possess an unnatural quality because it will be Infinitely Far-Reaching without sustaining an ability to prove successor is a total function. Nevertheless as a theoretical albeit highly artificial instrument, ISINF(A) is useful because of its counter-intuitive nature.
Notation Used in this Section: As earlier in this paper, HilbPrf α (x, y) will denote that y is a Hilbert-style proof of x from α. In our current discussion, JumpPrf α (x, y) will denote a second ∆ − 0 predicate, specifying that either the bit-string encoding the integer 2y or the bit-string encoding 1 + 2y represents a Hilbert-style proof from α of the theorem x .
A key point is that if a ∆ − 0 formula can identify α 's axioms, then JumpPrf α (x, y) will have a ∆ − 0 encoding, even if α does not technically recognize either successor or the operation of doubling are formally total functions. (In essence, ISINF(A)'s counter-intuitive -albeit artificial -features will be due to this fact.)
Definition of ISINF(A):
The system ISINF(A) will contain four axiom groups, similar to ISCE(A). Its Group-zero axiom will simply indicate the existence of the first three natural numbers, called 0, 1 and 2. ISINF(A)'s Group-1 and Group-2 axioms will have the same definitions as they did under ISCE(A). The novel aspect of ISINF(A) will be its Group-3 scheme. Unlike our prior formalism, ISINF(A)'s Group-3 scheme will contain two axioms.
These axioms, formalized by Equations (41) and (42), will be defined simultaneously via the self-referencing methodology of the Fixed Point Theorem. In essence, (41)'s fixed-point axiom will assert the ISINF(A) formalism is Hilbert-consistent. On the other hand, Theorem 6 will prove that (42)'s axiom will make ISINF(A) Infinitely Far Reaching. (The symbol (42) will denote x divided by 2 with upwards rounding, and ⊥ will denote the Gödel number of the sentence 0=1. )
We will not provide a formal encoding for (41) and ( Our contradiction proof will have a structure similar to Theorem 3's proof. We will therefore only sketch it. The only method by which ISINF(A) can learn about the existence of any integer i ≥ 3 consists of repeatedly applying Equation (42) The main point is that since p is a proof of ⊥ , some axiom in p 's proof must be invalid in the model M j . This implies axiom (41) is invalid in M j (because each other axiom used in p 's proof is valid in M j ). This contradicts p's presumed minimality by implying that a smaller q ≤ j < p is also a proof of ⊥ . Hence Item 1 is true because its negation is contradictory. Generalizations of Theorem 6 and Its Significance.
The system ISINF(A) is awkward because of the appearance of the two different proof predicates "HilbPrf α ( x , y )" and "JumpPrf α ( x , y )" in its Group-3 axioms. A second drawback is that ISINF(A) appears to be incompatible with the tangibility reflection principles (defined at the end of Section 4).
It is thus quite unlike ISCE(A), which was fully compatible with the tangibility reflection principles (via Theorem 3* ). As a whole, ISCE(A) is thus preferable over ISINF(A). One reason ISINF(A) is partially interesting, despite its awkward nature, is that it seems to clarify the meaning of the Theorems 1, 2 and 4, by Pudlák, Solovay and ourselves. In particular, it shows that these generalizations of the Second Incompleteness theorem do not technically apply to all formal axiom systems with Infinite Far Reach.
There is also a second interesting facet of Theorem 6's formalism that was brought to our attention in the form of an open question from Pavel Pudlák. Let us call F (x) an Extender Function iff it satisfies axioms (43) and (44) .
It is easy to construct a finite set of Π − 1 axioms, called say S , such that the union of S with the two axioms from Equations (43) and (44) to be an axiom system identical to Section 4's ISCE(A) formalism except for the following changes:
1. The IS.Extender(A) formalism will contain an extra function symbol F , and its Group-1 axiom class will contain the two additional axiom-sentences listed in Equations (43) and (44) . (No change will be made among IS.Extender(A)'s Group-2 axioms; they will thus not discuss any further properties of the newly created function symbol F .)
2. The Group-3 axiom of IS.Extender(A) will be identical to ISCE(A)'s Group-3 Kleenelike "I am consistent axiom" except that the pronoun "I" will now refer to a revised system that contains the two additional axiom-sentences given in Equations (43) For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that if one were to supplement the Equations (43) and (44) with Equation (45)'s further axiom, then a generalization of the Second Incompleteness Theorem will be activated.
In particular, Theorem 7 formalizes this effect. The Appendix D sketches a proof for Theorem 7 that essentially corroborates Theorem 7 by a reduction argument to the earlier results of the Theorems 1 and 2 by Pudlák and Solovay [25, 32] . As Appendix D explains, there is one added complication in proving Theorem 7, which did not arise in the proofs of the Theorems 1 and 2 by Pudlák and Solovay. After overcoming this problem, Appendix D will then finish Theorem 7's proof by applying the earlier methods that [25, 32] had previously used to prove their Theorems 1 and 2. 
Concluding Remarks
The sharp contrast between the positive and negative results of Theorems 3 and 4 is the main result of this paper. In combination, these propositions indicate the Second Incompleteness Effect for Hilbert-style deduction can be evaded when an axiom system employs the additive naming convention, although it becomes operative when the multiplicative convention is present.
These results differ from our prior study of semantic tableaux deduction because [43, 46, 48, 51] used axiom systems that could simultaneously recognize their own semantic tableaux consistency and addition as a total function. On the other hand, the Theorem 2 by Solovay [32] showed that no analog of this paradigm for Hilbert-styled deduction can even recognize successor as a total function. To evade the obstacle that was formalized by Solovay's theorem, our ISCE(A) formalism has thus replaced the conventional axiom declaring addition is a total function with an additive naming convention. Section 4's ISCE(A) axiom system is of interest also because it satisfies a "continuous expansion property" -where the concerned axiom system is associated with a sequence of integers K 1 < K 2 < K 3 ... such that the union of all the axioms with Gödel number less than K i can be combined to prove the existence of an integer greater than K i+1 . This construct is weaker than an axiom declaring successor is a total function. However, it allows ISCE(A) to retain at least some weak notion of an infinite growth among integers. Indeed, Equation (29) has shown that ISCE(A)'s continuous expansion sequence grows at a very fast super-exponential rate. Our chief results are thus that this rapid-growth of ISCE(A)'s additive convention is compatible with a boundary-case exception to the Second Incompleteness Theorem for Hilbert-style deduction, while the stronger multiplicative naming conventions (of Theorems 4 and 4* ) will reactivate the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
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Such compressed encodings are usually considered to be preferable and more efficient than an uncompressed encoding method, using say the Chinese Remainder Theorem [20] . All our theorems have analogs under such uncompressed encoding methods, but they are substantially more meaningful when one uses efficiently compressed encodings.
Appendix B: Sketch of Theorem 5's Proof Theorem 5's formal statement is similar to article [47] 's Theorem 2.3, except that it discusses Hilbert deduction rather than semantic tableaux deduction. We will therefore provide only a sketch of Theorem 5's proof.
Proof Sketch. Let 0 * denote the "diagonalizing" sentence defined below:
Consider the sentences (A) and (B) from Theorem 5's hypothesis. From the definitions of (A) and (B), it is trivial that " A ∧ B 0 * " . Since (A) and (B) are provable from α , we get:
It is clear that 0 λ (α) and 0 * are equivalent sentences under sufficiently strong models of arithmetic. However, we need more than this fact to prove Theorem 5. We need establish that a weak axiom system α (satisfying Theorem 5's hypothesis) can also recognize this equivalence.
To establish this last fact, let n again denote (33)'s Gödel number, encoded with Definition 2's overbrace notation. Then 0
is true. This implies (48) because Theorem 5's hypothesis indicates α can prove all logically
We shall now use (48) to deduce the validity of the Equation (49) (given below). Let Λ represent the sentence Subst*( n , 0 λ (α) ) , Θ represent the sentence (C) in Theorem 5's hypothesis, and Ξ be the identity 0 λ (α) ≡ 0 * . For these Λ , Θ and Ξ , it is easy to infer that α Λ ∧ Θ ⇒ Ξ (because Λ ∧ Θ enables α to immediately deduce that the only value for h satisfying Subst*( n , h ) is the quantity 0 λ (α) ). Thus since α can prove Λ , Θ and Λ ∧ Θ ⇒ Ξ , we get:
Also, the combination of Equations (47) and (49) trivially implies that
The justification of Theorem 5 will now be finished by applying the roughly classic paradigm where a proof formally verifies the statement that: "There is no proof of me". In particular, let p denote the proof of 0 λ (α). (Note that p's existence is assured by Equation (50).)
Choose a second integer q satisfying Log λ (q) = p. Let r denote the Gödel number of the sentence 0 λ (α). Also, if n represents (33)'s Gödel number, then 0 λ (α) is encoded as:
The key point is that Equation (51) must be false because if one replaces its three variables y, z, and h with the three constants p, q, and r then (51)'s formal statement is clearly negated (via the usual diagonalization argument). Since Theorem 5's hypothesis indicates α has a capacity to prove all valid ∆ − 0 sentences, it clearly must also have a capacity to refute any Π − 1 sentence that is invalid in the Standard Model. Hence, we obtain:
The combination of (50) and (52) shows that α is inconsistent. 2 convention. In this case, Base(α) will denote the byte-sequence encoding the axiom list: " φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 , .... φ n ". Also, A will denote Base(α)'s "Gödel number".
2. FinGenPrf(A, t, p) will denote a ∆ − 0 formula which states that p is a Hilbert-style proof of the theorem t from a finitely generated axiom system whose particular Gödel number is identified by the integer A . Lemma 6 . There exists a Π − 1 theorem V of Peano Arithmetic and an exact formalization M for encoding FinGenPrf(A,t,p) as a ∆ − 0 formula such that no consistent, finitely-generated axiom system α may contain both V as an axiom and prove (53)'s statement corroborating its own Hilbert consistency.
Lemma 6's proof is not provided here because the same basic techniques that Section 5 used to prove its Theorem 4 will also corroborate Lemma 6. Thus, the intuition behind Lemma 6 is quite simple: It is that if one is allowed the freedom to pick the most amenable available ∆ − 0 encoding for the formula FinGenPrf(A, t, p), henceforth denoted as M , and also given the freedom to choose a sufficiently strong accompanying Π − 1 sentence V , then these two extra degrees of freedom will allow one to easily modify Section 5's proof of Theorem 4 to additionally corroborate Lemma 6's statement. Lemma 6 will be interesting because it turns out that after one has established its validity, for just one specialized form of ∆ − 0 encoding of the FinGenPrf(A, t, p) predicate, a significantly more general result can be derived -whose formalism is independent of the utilized ∆ − 0 encoding and which also applies to essentially all axiom systems of infinite cardinality as well.
One further definition will help explore this point.
Definition 4. Let β denote a finitely-generated axiom system and α denote a recursively enumerable axiom system that is not necessarily finitely-generated. In this context, β will be called a Base-Subset of α iff all β's axioms are axioms of α . Proof: For the sake of establishing a proof-by-contradiction, let us assume Theorem 4* was false. Then some consistent recursively enumerable axiom system α will satisfy Theorem 4* 's hypothesis and be able to prove its own Hilbert consistency.
Let p denote such a proof of α's consistency, and γ denote the finite subset of axioms from α that appears in the proof p . Also, let β denote the union of γ with the combination of the Π − 1 sentence W and with all the multiplicative naming convention's axioms.
Then β is a finitely-generated system (because γ had finite cardinality). Since the first paragraph of this proof had presumed α was consistent and because β ⊂ α , it follows that β must also be certainly consistent. Hence, β satisfies the two requirements of Lemma 6's hypothesis. This lemma will thus imply that β is unable to prove its own Hilbert consistency.
We will now complete our proof-by-contradiction by proving the statement + below (which contradicts the preceding paragraph's final sentence): + The axiom system β can verify its own Hilbert-consistency.
We will use Lemma 7 to prove +. This lemma implies that any finitely-generated axiom system, containing V * , has the ability to infer β's consistency from α's consistency. Also, V * is provable from γ because γ's definition indicated it includes the axiom W (and because Definition 5 indicated that W includes the clause V * .) These facts imply that β must be able to verify its own Hilbert-consistency because γ (which is a subset of β )
possesses an ability to verify the consistency of α (which is a superset of β ) . Hence, Lemma 7 certainly implies the validity of + .
The combination of the preceding proofs of + and of + 's negation enables our proofby-contradiction to reach its desired end by showing an unavoidable contradiction will occur if Theorem 4* is false. 2
Added Comment: The only significant difference between Theorems 4 and 4* is that the latter isolates a particular Π − 1 sentence W that acts as an uniform threshold for activating the multiplicative naming convention's version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. This appendix's proof for Theorem 4* was written in a highly abbreviated style essentially because Section 5 had already proved the only slightly weaker Theorem 4.
Also, it should be noted that Theorem 4* 's requirement that α contain the Π − 1 sentence W as an axiom can be replaced by a milder constraint that α merely retain an ability to prove some fixed and pre-specified Π − 1 theorem W * .
Appendix D: Sketch of Theorem 7's Proof
This appendix will sketch a proof of Theorem 7 by employing the Theorems 1 and 2 of Pudlák and Solovay as the main interim step that is needed to corroborate Theorem 7 . The key challenge in proving Theorem 7 can be realized when one considers the possibility that we could plausibly be examining a non-standard model M of the set of natural numbers where the extender function F satisfies the following two conditions:
1. F (x) = x + 1 when x is a standard integer, and 2. F (x) = x − 1 when x is any non-standard number.
Such a function F is consistent with the axioms from Equations (43) through (45) . However, this particular function F (and many other examples) will grow at a slower rate than the successor function. Our strategy will thus be to find a way to apply the machinery of the Theorems 1 and 2 of Pudlák and Solovay to prove Theorem 7 despite the added complication that F could be plausibly growing at a slower rate than the successor function.
To overcome this difficulty, let Ψ(x) denote the following formula
Also, let us assume that Theorem 7's Π 
Then by essentially utilizing Equations (44), (45), (56), (57) and (58) 
The central point is thus that although the axiom system α may lack the power to recognize that successor is a total function in a formally global sense, it will be able to apply the conjunction of Equations (44), (45) , (56) and (57) to infer the validity of the Item B (above)
-which essentially states that the operation of successor is indeed a total function in a local sense among the set of integers x that satisfy the condition Ψ(x) .
Once we have established the preceding condition, the remainder of Theorem 7's proof can rest on a reduction argument that applies essentially the formal machinery that Pudlák and Solovay used to prove Theorems 1 and 2. By this we mean that if α could prove the sentence ∀ p ¬ HilbPrf α ( 0 = 1 , p ) then it could clearly also verify Equation (59)'s assertion (which essentially states that no integer p satisfying Ψ(p) is a proof of 0=1.)
Since items A-C establish Ψ is functionally equivalent to a definable cut, the prior mathematical machinery from the literature about definable cuts can then finish the proof of Theorem 7, in the same manner that Pudlák and Solovay previously used it to prove Theorems 1 and 2. In particular, this method will establish that no consistent axiom system α ⊃ W can prove its own consistency -because otherwise α would then also prove Equation (59) -a result which would render α automatically inconsistent.
In summary, this appendix was kept abbreviated because it sought to only summarize how the methods of Pudlák and Solovay can be used to prove Theorem 7's statement, even in the extreme case where α does not recognize successor as a total function. It has shown α can prove Ψ(x) satisfies conditions A-C, thus making the Pudlák-Solovay paradigm applicable.
